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Expansion of the Williams Act: Tender Offer
Regulation for Non -conventional Purchases
INTRODUCTION
In'the last twelve years, the definition of a tender offer' has
proven to be elusive. Developing case law has significantly broad-
ened the definition beyond the traditional scope of the term. Two
recent decisions have followed that trend by further expanding the
parameters of tender offers.
The District Court for Massachusetts broke new ground by ex-
tending the application of the Williams Act s to include open mar-
ket purchases of securities.3 In S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua In-
vestment Company,4  the court determined that a publicly
announced intention to acquire stock to obtain control of a corpo-
ration, followed by a rapid acquisition of large blocks of shares
through open market purchases, constituted a tender offer."
In Welman v. Dickinson,' the District Court for the Southern
District of New York also interpreted the Williams Act liberally.
The court held that arguably private purchases from a large num-
ber of "sophisticated"' sellers resembled a traditional tender offer
1. A tender offer is generally defined as "[a] public offer or solicitation by a company, an
individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of
a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon
specified terms for cash and/or securities." E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973). [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN].
2. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
3. Previous decisions had held that open market purchases were outside the scope of
tender offer regulation. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,565 (2d Cir. 1978); Financial General Bankshares, Inc.
v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978); D-Z Inv.
Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,771 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
4. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978).
5. Id. at 94,936.
6. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
7. Prior to Dickinson, "sophisticated" holders of stock, such as financial institutions,
were deemed able to withstand being pressured into hasty investment decisions because of
their knowledge of the market. Therefore, it was thought sophisticated investors did not
need the protection of the Williams Act. See, e.g., D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Block &
Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEC. REG. L. J. 133 (1978).
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and therefore came within the Williams Act.
While the S-G Securities and Dickinson decisions expanded the
coverage of tender offer regulation, they also gave further judicial
definition to what constitutes a tender offer. The SEC has affirmed
this evolving case law in its recently proposed definition of a
tender offer.'
This article will first summarize traditional regulation of tender
offers under the Williams Act. Second, the two cases will be dis-
cussed and analyzed in light of their apparent departure from
these historical views. Third, the effect of these decisions on future
tender offers and their regulation will be discussed. Finally, the
SEC's proposed definition of a tender offer will be reviewed.
TENDER OFFER REGULATION-A BRIEF SUMMARY
Traditional Tender Offers
Before the passage of the Williams Act in 1968, tender offers
were basically unregulated.e Traditionally, the offer was character-
ized as a publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of
a corporation to tender their shares to the offeror"e at a premium
price." A distinctive feature of the traditional tender offer was
that offerors conditioned their obligation to purchase. A stated
minimum number of shares had to be tendered. As the shares were
tendered, they were placed in a depository,1' and the offeror was
not required to take up the shares until the required number were
deposited. If fewer than the stated number were tendered, the of-
feror did not have to purchase any shares.13 If the offer was over-
8. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
9. Federal regulations required pre-transaction disclosure for both proxies and exchange
offers. Also, tender offers were regulated to the extent that an offeror acquiring more than
5% of the outstanding stock of a company had to file a statement with the SEC within 10
days. However, when a cash tender offer was made, no information needed to be disclosed to
shareholders. "Such an offer can be made on the most minimal disclosure; yet the invest-
ment decision-whether to retain the security or sell-is in substance little different from
the decison made on an original purchase of a security, or an offer to exchange one security
for another." HousE OF REPRESENTATivEs REPORT ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CoMMERCE,
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Ses. reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws
2811, 2813 [hereinafter cited as 1968 HousE REPORT]. It was this gap in the regulation of
securities that Congress intended the Williams Act to fill.
10. Offerors in the tender offer context are those who offer to purchase shares. The sell-
ing parties are solicitees who tender their stock.
11. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HAsv. L. REv. 1250-51 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Developing Meaning].
12. The depository is usually a bank.
13. Developing Meaning, supra note 11, at 1252.
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subscribed,14 however, the offeror needed to purchase only the
stated minimum number of shares. Inequities arose in the oversub-
scription situation because the offeror could choose which shares to
buy.
Additional inequities involved in the traditional tender offer fur-
ther disadvantaged target shareholders. The basic evil of the pre-
Williams Act tender offer was that the offeror could "operate in
almost complete secrecy . . . [Tihe Law [did] not even require
that he disclose his identity, the source of his funds, who his asso-
ciates [were] or what he [intended] to do if he [gained] control of
the corporation.' 5 Compounding the problem, the shareholder was
given only a short period of time to respond to the offer, which was
generally priced 16% above the market value." In toto, the target
corporation shareholder was pressured into making a hurried and
uninformed decision.
In response to these inequities and the increased popularity of
this method of corporate acquisition, 17 Senator Harrison Williams
of New Jersey introduced a bill to regulate the cash tender offer.18
This bill was passed in 1968 as the Williams Act Amendments to
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.19
14. An offer became oversubscribed when the shareholders of the target company offered
more shares to the offeror than it desired to take up. Because there was no mechanism to
determine whose shares would be purchased in this situation, the offeror usually bought on
a first-come, first-served basis. Further, it was this practice which caused target sharehold-
ers to make hurried investment decisions for fear of having their shares rejected if they
waited too long. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(6) remedies this situation. See note 19 infra and accom-
panying text.
15. 1968 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2812.
16. See Developing Meaning, supra note 11, at 1251 n. 9.
17. The increased use of cash tender offers to acquire control of corporations was evi-
denced by the following statistics: in 1966, there were over 100 such offers involving compa-
nies with securities listed on national securities exchanges, in 1960, there had been eight.
1968 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2812.
18. S. REP. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Wil-
liams on S.510). While Senator Williams' first introduction of tender offer regulation was
not met with an enthusiastic response (no hearings were held on the original bill), many of
his proposals formed the basis for his second bill which was proposed in 1967. See Hearings
on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 175, 244 (1967); 1968 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 12. It
is generally recognized that Williams' first bill failed because it leaned too much in favor of
incumbent management.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)(1970). Sections 78n(d)(5)-(7)(1976) contain the
thrust of the Act. The main purpose of these sections is to assure equal treatment for all
shareholders of the target corporation.
Section 78n(d)(5) allows shareholders to withdraw shares tendered within seven days of
the time of the offer for tenders is first published, and anytime after the expiration of 60
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The Williams Act
The primary purpose of the Williams Act was "investor protec-
tion".20 Congress sought to alleviate the pressure placed on target
shareholders in tender offer situations without discouraging take-
over bids.21 To accomplish this end, the Act required full disclo-
sure by the offeror in connection with tender offers.22
days from the date of the original offer.
Section 78n(d)(6) provides for pro rata acceptance of securities tendered within the first
10 days of the offer (where more securities have been deposited than the tender offeror is
bound to take up).
Section 78n(d)(7) requires that any increase in tender price shall be paid to all persons
whose securities are taken up.
Although this article deals primarily with' what constitutes a tender offer under § 78n(d),
the Williams Act is also comprised of sections 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(e)-(f).
Section 78m(d) requires that any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of equity stock registered pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act (with minor exceptions), must, within 10 days after such acquisi-
tion, send to the issuer of the security and the SEC a statement describing, (1) the back-
ground and identity of the purchaser or purchasers on whose behalf the purchases have
been or are to be effectuated; (2) the source and amount of funds or other consideration
used or to be used in making the purchases; (3) if the purpose of the purchases or prospec-
tive purchases is to acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans
the purchaser may have for liquidation of the issuer, to sell its assets or merge it with any
other persons, or to make any other major change in its corporate structure; (4) the number
of shares of such security beneficially owned and the number of securities which such person
has a right to acquire, directly or indirectly; and (5) information as to any contracts, ar-
rangements, or understandings with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer.
Section 78m(e) provides that it shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of stock
registered pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act (with minor exceptions) to purchase any
of its own shares if such purchase is in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may adopt.
Section 78n(e) is the Williams Act's broad anti-fraud provision which makes it unlawful
for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state any
necessary fact or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in
connection with any tender offer.
Section 78n(f) contains provisions for dissemination pf information to shareholders in the
event that any offerors are to become directors of the target company upon completion of
the tender offer.
The SEC has also adopted rules and regulations pursuant to its authority under the Wil-
liams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)(1976). See 17 C.F.R. 240.13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f).
20. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) en-
hances protection by making it unlawful for any person to make a tender offer in which he
will become the owner of greater than 5% of a class of equity stock without first filing with
the SEC a statement containing the information specified in § 78m(d).
21. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
22. Full disclosure was considered necessary because:
The competence and integrity of a company's management and of the persons
who seek management positions, are of vital importance to stockholders. Secrecy
in this area is inconsistent with the expectations of the people who invest in the
securities of publicly held corporations and impairs public confidence in securities
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The Williams Act, however, does not define "tender offer". In
past years, the SEC has also refused to define a tender offer.23
In the Commission's view, the term 'tender offer' is to be inter-
preted flexibly in accordance with the intended purposes of Sec-
tions 14(d) and 14(e) of the Williams Act. Therefore, the determi-
nation of whether a transaction or series of transactions
constitutes a tender offer depends upon consideration of the par-
ticular facts and circumstances in light of such purposes."
As a result, the courts, the SEC, and practitioners had the task of
determining whether particular securities transactions were tender
offers 25 and thus subject to the extensive regulatory requirements
of the Williams Act.2 6
In interpreting the coverage of the Williams Act, a number of
commentators have argued that Congress intended to regulate only
those transactions conforming to the traditional understanding of a
tender offer.2 7 However, several judicial decisions and SEC staff in-
terpretations have rejected that contention. 8 These have held that
as a medium of investment. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 1,2 (1967).
Yet, Congress recognized that the competing interest of investor, management and offeror
had to be considered:
extreme care [must be exercised] to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either
in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The
bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while
at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
fairly present their case. Id. at 3.
See note 18 supra.
23. But see note 99 infra and accompanying text.
24. Proposed Tender Offer Rules and Schedule, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fan. Sac. L.
REP. (CCH) T 81,935 at 81,213 (Feb. 5, 1979). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BaRL-
STEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977) [hereinafter cited
as DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS], where the authors suggest a rationale for not defining
a tender offer:
Congress and the SEC believed that, for the purposes of the federal regulatory
scheme, a tender offer might well encompass transactions yet unborn which were
not considered tender offers in general custom and usage. Thus, the question of
just what was encompassed by the term "tender offer" was intentionally left open,
in an effort to preserve the flexibility of both the SEC and the courts in making
determinations on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1.
25. In Dickinson there were extensive discussions by Sun's attorneys as to the state of
tender offer law. The attorneys indicated that the law regarding tender offers was still
murky and that the concept of a tender offer was still in flux. Thus, the lawyers attempted
to structure a "privately negotiated" transaction which they knew was outside the scope of
the tender offer provisions. Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) I 96,198 at 95,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See notes 75-77 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 19-20 supra.
27. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 74-75.
28. See, e.g., Loews Corp. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. IM. July 11,
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transactions which induce the same shareholder impact as a con-
ventinal tender offer 29 are within the Act regardless of the form of
the transaction.30 This position has resulted in an expansion of the
coverage of the Williams Act.
Expansion of Tender Offers After the Williams Act
Shortly after passage of the Williams Act, the SEC extended the
Act's coverage by declaring that "special bids"'" were tender offers
within the Act. The special bid is a stock market device for hand-
1974); Cattleman's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per
stipulation, Civ. No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
29. The "shareholder impact" test was first discussed in Developing Meaning, supra
note 11, where the author reasoned that "[u]nder this approach, methods of acquisition
representing deviations from the conventional tender offer, but exerting the same deleteri-
ous pressures on shareholders, could not be resorted to for purposes of circumventing the
regulatory scheme." Id. at 1275-76.
30. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although refusing to expand the mean-
ing of a tender offer beyond its conventional definition, has suggested that in the appropri-
ate case, it would expand the meaning of that term. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,565, at 94,361 (2d Cir.
1978).
In Kennecott, Curtiss-Wright quietly purchased 9.9% of the outstanding Kennecott
shares in transactions both on and off the national securities exchanges. Kennecott claimed
that those purchases made between November 23, 1977, and March 10, 1978, constituted a
tender offer within the meaning of the Williams Act. The district court judge found that:
(1) Curtiss-Wright had purchased substantially all of Kennecott's stock on na-
tional exchanges;
(2) although one of Curtiss-Wright's brokers had solicited fifty (50) Kennecott
shareholders off the floor of the exchange, the sales were consummated on the
floor. Further, the potential sellers of Kennecott stock were merely asked whether
they wanted to sell their shares. They were offered no premium over the market
price, nor given a deadline by which to make a decision; and
(3) twelve institutional holders of Kennecott stock were solicited; however, these
holders were sophisticated and therefore, unlikely to be forced into hurried, ill-
considered decisions. Id.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
Several courts and commentators have taken the position ... that other unique
methods of stock acquisition which exert pressure on shareholders to make unin-
formed, ill-considered decisions to sell, as is possible in the case of tender offers,
should be treated as tender offers for the purposes of the statute. . . .The Second
Circuit has not yet moved this far. ...
Although broad and remedial interpretations of the Act may create no problems
insofar as the antifraud provisions of subsection (e) of section 78(n) are concerned,
this may not be true with regard to sections (d)(5)-(d)(7). . . .It seems unlikely
that Congress intended "tender offer" to be so broadly interpreted as to make
these provisions unworkable.
Id. at 94,361.
31. S.E.C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968). See also
Developing Meaning, supra note 11, at 1261.
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ling the purchase of blocks of securities too large to be readily ac-
commodated in the regular auction market. A prospective pur-
chaser announces a special bid on the market tape, specifying the
number of shares desired and a bid price that is substantially
higher than the market price. As shareholders respond to the bid,
the sell orders are executed immediately at the bid price, until the
entire block has been acquired or the bid has been withdrawn.
The special bid, although similar in some respects to the conven-
tional tender offer, does not condition purchases on the tendering
of a pre-determined minimum number of shares. Further, instead
of relinquishing control of their shares for a period before sale,
shareholder's sell their shares immediately.
Although the SEC has not explained its reasons for characteriz-
ing special bids as tender offers, its decision is logical. The SEC
chose to view the special bid's impact, not just its form. A special
bid may involve the same lack of disclosure and accompanying
pressure tactics that prompted the passage of the Williams Act.
Therefore, special bids constitute the type of activity that should
fall within the Act's purview.
The Williams Act was further expanded in Cattleman's Invest-
ment Co. v. Fears.3 2 In Cattleman's, the offeror3 3 solicited shares
through a scheme that included personal meetings, telephone calls,
and letters. Although the court did not specify the number of Cat-
tleman shareholders approached, the solicitation was characterized
as "active and widespread".8"
The court found that the offeror's conduct deprived the share-
holders of information pertinent to investment decisions.35 Because
the Williams Act was intended to alleviate this type of conduct,
the court held that this purchasing scheme came within the Act."
By doing so, the court expanded the concept of a tender offer to
include solicitations of stock that place the same pressures on
shareholders as conventional tender offers.
The SEC's position in LSL Corporaton7 further extended
32. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
33. The offeror was George Fears. He owned 120,596 shares, or 4.86% of the outstanding
shares of Cattleman's Investment Company prior to his purchasing scheme. He bought
177,004 additional shares, giving him holdings in excess of 5%. Id. at 1250.
34. Id. at 1251-52.
35. Id. at 1252.
36. Id. at 1253.
37. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. R"p. (CCH) 1 79,715 (SEC Staff Letter,
Jan. 8, 1974).
19801
Loyola University Law Journal
tender offer regulation. LSL requested an SEC opinion as to
whether a certain method of purchases constituted a tender offer.
LSL desired to increase its holdings in another corporation from
30% to approximately 50%. LSL proposed to purchase these
shares through both open market and privately negotiated transac-
tions. LSL also planned to send out, prior to commencement of
any purchases, a press release announcing the intended acquisi-
tions, and to have copies of the release mailed to the target's
shareholders."
The SEC declined to express any view on whether the described
program of purchases could be made without satisfying the disclo-
sure requirements of the Act. This was a change in the SEC's posi-
tion. In a similar case, the SEC had previously issued a no-action
letter.3 9 Although the SEC staff did not set forth their reasons for
now denying the no-action letter, their decision may have rested
on the perception that the press releases were equivalent to public
solicitations. The disclosures proposed by LSL, moreover, did not
insure the protection of investors mandated by the Williams Act.
In their treatment of special bids, Cattleman's, and LSL indi-
cate that the coverage of the Williams Act is not limited to the
conventional tender offer situation. The common thread running
through each of these cases is the pressure placed on target share-
holders. If a scheme forces an investor to make a hurried, unin-
formed decision, the transaction may violate the Williams Act.
S-G SECURITIES
Although the courts and the SEC had classified certain "non-
conventional" solicitations as tender offers4" prior to S-G Securi-
ties Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Company,4 1 neither had included
open market puchases4 within the scope of the Williams Act.48
38. Id. at 83,910.
39. American Gen. Ins. Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,588 (SEC Staff Letter, Dec. 17, 1971). LSL had relied on this earlier no-action letter in
arguing that its purchasing scheme was not a tender offer.
40. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
41. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978).
42. The term 'tender offer' was deliberately left vague by Congress and the SEC. It is
now well settled, however, that the term embraces not only conventional tender offers for-
mally announced by communications to shareholders, but also more. subtle activities
designed to lead to an offer of shares. On the other hand, it is by now equally well settled
that market purchases of stock, however aggressive, do not constitute a tender offer. Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. See D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
[Vol. 11
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The underlying rationale was that "[i]n ordinary market transac-
tions, no pressure is applied by the prospective purchaser on the
selling shareholder; the latter reaches his decision to sell indepen-
dently."44 When there is no pressure on the selling shareholder,
there is no need for the protections of the Williams Act.
The cases exempting open market purchases from tender offer
regulation, however, involved purchases made prior to any public
announcement of a conventional tender offer or independent buy-
ing program, proposed or actual. 45 The S-G Securities case did in-
volve widespread publicity that placed pressure on target share-
holders. For this reason, the District Court for Massachusetts
decided that this was an appropriate case to extend the boundaries
of tender offer regulation.
Factual Background
In the latter part of 1977, J.B. Fuqua, president and sole share-
holder of Fuqua Investment Company, approached representatives
of S-G Securities, Inc., and proposed a combination between S-G
and a Fuqua-controlled corporation. Merger discussions proved
fruitless. Fuqua then made a tender offer proposal to S-G and sub-
sequently drafted a press release." The press release disclosed that
FIC sought between 475,000 and 600,000 shares of S-G common at
a price of $3 per share.47 S-G rejected FIC's tender offer proposal.
FIC then countered with a proposal to buy buy a substantial
amount of authorized but unissued shares of S-G. This proposal
was immediately followed by a second press release in which FIC
stated the terms of this second offer. The next day, S-G reported
its rejection of FIC's second offer.
Within the next two weeks FIC purchased, through private
transactions and open market purchases, a total of 400,000 shares
of S-G common stock. FIC then issued a third press release in
(CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gulf & Western Ind., Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 356 F. Supp 1066, 1073-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd (but not mentioning this point) 476 F.
2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer
Indus., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973).
44. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Company, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,750 at 94,935 (D. Mass. 1978) (quoting Developing Meaning 1250, 1276
n. 137 (1973)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 94,930.
47. Id. The effect of the announcement in the market place was immediate as the aver-
age trading volume of 475 shares per day jumped to greater than 6,800 shares per day. Id.
19801
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which it "announced its purchases of S-G common stock to date,
its intention to gain operating control of S-G, and the possibility
that it might require additional S-G shares in the future.' ' 4 Three
days after this announcement, FIC made a final large block market
purchase.'9
In response to these purchases, S-G filed suit50 alleging viola-
tions of the Williams Act, specifically: 1) that FIC failed to disclose
information prior to commencing a tender offer as specified by
Rule 14(d)-100 51 of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC; and 2)
that the manner in which FIC conducted its tender offer failed to
comply with the remedial provisions of sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the
Act.5 2
The court noted that although FIC's actions did not constitute a
traditional tender offer, the purchases posed the same dangers that
section 14(d) was designed to alleviate.53 The district court judge
thus concluded that a publicly announced intention by a purchaser
to acquire a substantial block of stock for purposes of control and
subsequent rapid purchases of large blocks of stock through open
market purchases constitutes a tender offer.54
Appropriateness of the Decision: Do Publicity and Substantial
Open Market Purchases Constitute a Tender Offer?
The threshold question is whether Congress intended open mar-
ket purchases to fall within the ambit of the tender offer regula-
tions. Senator Williams made explicit his intention that open mar-
ket purchases not be subject to the Act. He concluded that the
early disclosure provisions would have a disruptive effect on the
market, and further, he believed that no pressure was involved in
48. Id. at 94,931.
49. Id. This large block purchase was for 115,600 shares of S-G common stock. Id.
50. S-G sought a preliminary injunction to restrain FIC from (1) acquiring additional
shares of S-G common stock, (2) voting or otherwise exercising rights of ownership of those
shares already owned, and (3) attempting to influence or control S-G and its management.
Upon S-G's ex parte motion, an order was issued temporarily restraining FIC from any
further acquisition of S-G common stock. Id. at 94,931-932.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1979), regulates the disclosure requirements of tender of-
fers. It requires the offerors to disclose the number of shares owned by the person or group
involved, the source of the funds used or to be used to acquire the shares, and whether the
purpose of the acquisition is to gain control of the company, sell its assets, merge it with
another company, or make any major changes in its business or corporate structure.
52. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
53. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Company, 11979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. RaP. (CCH) 96,750 at 94,936.
54. Id.
[Vol. 11
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the open market purchase."
Senator Williams' position presumes that open market purchases
are made without any impermissible outside influences on prospec-
tive shareholders. Securities transactions, however, are not con-
ducted in a vacuum. Certain information and rumor are naturally
present in the marketplace. This outside data affects the share-
holder's decision on whether to sell or hold his shares. Senator
Williams believed that this type of information should not be regu-
lated by the Williams Act.5" Although this information may cause
some pressure to be put on the shareholder, it is not the same de-
gree of pressure that is involved in a tender offer.
However, when the open market purchaser uses aggressive buy-
ing tactics, the degree of pressure that the Williams Act attempted
to alleviate is present. The decision in S-G Securities rests on the
theory that widespread publicity placed this degree of pressure on
the target shareholders. The court found that Fuqua's press re-
leases were very similar to a public announcement of a tender offer
invitation. The court concluded that the publicity, which outlined
in detail the purchasing plans and specified FIC's desire to acquire
control of the target, forced shareholders into making uninformed,
ill-considered decisions.57 That the shareholders sold their stock in
the open market did not mitigate this pressure.
Under the court's analysis, whether conduct falls within the Act
depends on shareholder impact. The court reasoned that the form
of a transaction, i.e. an open market purchase, should not be al-
lowed to overcome the substance of the transaction." The S-G Se-
curities decision extends the definition of tender offer to encom-
pass the type of situation that Congress intended to eliminate;
pressure on target shareholders caused by lack of adequate
disclosure.
At first blush, with all the publicity in this case, it seems incon-
sistent that Fuqua should be charged with failure to disclose. Fu-
qua's disclosures, however, were limited to price terms and a pro-
55. See 113 CONG. REC. 845, 856 (1967).
56. Id.
57. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Company, [1979 Transfer Binder) FED. SE.
L. REP. (CCH) % 96,750, at 94,936 (D. Mass. 1978).
58. If tender offers were defined strictly in accordance with the conventional conception,
the requirements of section 78n(d) could too easily be avoided through slight deviations
from the conventional model, thus frustrating the Congressional intent. A more flexible ap-
proach is necessary. See Harvard Note, supra note 11, at 1271.
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fessed desire to gain control of S-G.6 9 The essential disclosures,
such as the background of the purchaser, any plans of the pur-
chaser to change the structure of the corporation, or the source
and amount of funds used to effectuate the purchases, were not
disclosed. Therefore, if the outside influences involved in S-G Se-
curities pressured shareholders in contravention of the Act, the
court was correct in holding this transaction to be a tender offer.
The widespread publicity arising from the FIC press releases
pressured shareholders in three ways to make hurried and ill-con-
sidered investment decisions. First, the public announcement of a
proposed buying program to acquire control placed the target
shareholder in the same dilemma that he faced in the traditional
tender offer. If he retained his shares, he took the risk that the
offeror, after gaining control, would alter the management of the
company to its detriment. On the other hand, if he sold his shares,
he might be giving up an investment that would ultimately prove
profitable.
Second, the shareholders of S-G, who had full knowledge of
FIC's intention to control the company, were pressured to sell their
securities before FIC acquired the amount of stock it desired. If
the shareholder did not act quickly, the purchasing program might
end before the shareholder could sell.
Third, the publicity of the proposed takeover program immedi-
ately caused trading to increase in S-G common stock.60 The in-
creased trading caused the market price to rise. Shareholders could
benefit from the inflated premium on their stock if they acted im-
mediately," yet they lacked the information to make an informed
and carefully considered investment decision. Because the pres-
sures associated with a traditional tender offer were present in S-G
Securities, this was an appropriate case for expanding the concept
of tender offers to include open market purchases.
S-G Securities leaves unanswered which open market purchases
will remain unregulated and which will be subject to the provisions
59. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Company, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
REP. (CCH) 1 96,750, at 94,936 (D. Mass. 1978).
60. In a two week period prior to the publicity, S-G common stock had traded within a
range of 1 7/ -2 per share on an average trading volume of approximately 475 shares per day.
Two days after the first announcement, S-G's trading volume averaged 35,700 shares per
day within a range of 21/2-23/. Id.
61. This inflated premium was similar to the premium a solicitee would receive in a
traditional tender offer.
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of the Williams Act. 62 Clearly, when a purchasing scheme places no
pressure on shareholders, no tender offer occurs.68 A problem may
arise, however, when a person makes a substantial number of open
market purchases and rumors begin to spread with regard to this
activity." It is difficult to predict what a court would do in this
situation." The decision whether those purchases are tender offers
depends on the totality of the purchaser's conduct and an evalua-
tion of the pressure that conduct places on the shareholders."
62. See also Developing Meaning, supra note 11, at 1271.
63. Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,126 (E.D. Mo. 1979). In Chromalloy, Sun Corp. purchased stock on
the open market and made one block purchase off the exchange. The block purchase in-
volved no solicitation of shares, no premium above the market price, no time limit and no
minimum purchase contingency. In the face of an allegation that a tender offer in violation
of section 14(d) had occured, the court stated that "[R]egardless of the ultimate meaning
ascribed to 'tender offer' under the Williams Act, . . this Court is certain that the situation
here could not fall within that definition. The evidence adduced . . .showed no pressure
whatsoever placed on the shareholders." Id. at 96,223.
64. In this situation, the market price will invariably rise due to speculation in the stock.
65. A plausible answer to this difficult question may be found in the S-G Securities
decision itself. There, the court held that it was the pre-tender offer publicity which ran
afoul of section 14(d). Presumably, any publicity occurring after the purchasing scheme be-
gins is a natural result of the marketplace and not attributable to the purchaser. In this
situation, section 14(d) would not be violated and the filing of a Schedule 13D should suf-
fice. See note 19 supra.
However, if the post-purchase publicity is initiated by the purchaser and he is still solicit-
ing shares of the target corporation, the S-G Securities rationale should again be applicable.
The purchases made both prior to and after the publicity could be deemed a tender offer
because of the total "scheme" of purchases.
66. One guide for determining whether certain purchases constitute a tender offer was
suggested in Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Ind., Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RzP.
(CCH) 97,107 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The factors that the district court there considered were:
1. Whether there is an 'active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders'
for shares of an issuer;
2. Whether the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's
stock;
3. Whether the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the prevailing mar-
ket price;
4. Whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
5. Whether the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of
shares, and perhaps, subject to the ceiling of a fixed maximum number to be
purchased;
6. Whether the offer is open for only a limited period of time;
7. Whether the offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their stock; and
8. Whether public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the tar-
get company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation of large amounts of the
target company securities. Id. at 96,148.
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THE Dickinson DECISION
The factual background
In Welman v. Dickinson,17 the litigation stemmed from the ac-
quisition by Sun Company, Inc.6 of roughly 34% 6' of the stock of
Becton, Dickinson & Company.70 Fairleigh Dickinson, the ousted
Chairman of BD, wanted to reacquire control of the company. He
planned to find a corporation interested in acquiring a controlling
percentage of BD stock,71 and enlisted the aid of the investment
banking firms of Salomon Brothers and F. Eberstadt & Company.
Between April and December, 1977, Salomon and Eberstadt ar-
ranged meetings with a number of large corporations. However,
these efforts failed; the corporations were not interested in a take-
over attempt in the face of hostile management.
Simultaneous to Dickinson's attempts to find someone to take-
over BD, Sun was looking to diversify by investing in institutions
outside the energy field. Sun sought the acquisition of no less than
20% and not more than a 50% interest in three or four companies
by investing some $300-400 million in each organization.7 2 "Thus,
the stage was now set for the main event", 73 and, at a meeting on
December 27, 1977, Sun decided to solicit individual and institu-
tional shareholders of BD in order to acquire control of that
company.
Strategy for the solicitation was narrowed to (1) open market
purchases, (2) a conventional tender offer, or (3) private purchases.
In the face of a hostile target, a conventional tender offer was not
considered attractive.7 A procedure was needed that would enable
the acquisition to be effectuated quickly and would put Sun in
67. [1979 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
68. Sun is a Pennsylvania corporation whose principal business is oil and gas.
69. 34% of the outstanding shares of Becton, Dickinson & Company represent enough
"to have a significant voice in BD's future direction." Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918 at 95,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
70. BD is a New Jersey corporation which manufactures health care products and medi-
cal testing and research equipment.
71. As part of Fairleigh Dickinson's deal to sell his corporate holdings, Dickinson wanted
to become chairman of BD again. Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
72. Id. at 95,824.
73. Id. Since Sun's strategy was to move as quickly as possible without public notice, the
hostility of management was no deterrent.
74. A conventional tender offer was ruled out because it could lead to competitive bid-
ding which would make the desired acquisition more expensive. Also, there might be time
consuming legal maneuvering to try to thwart the acquisition effort. Id. at 95,826.
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physical possession of the shares in the shortest possible time.
On January 9, 1978, Dickinson's lawyers met with Salomon and
Eberstadt. The lawyers indicated that the law regarding tender of-
fers was still murky and that the concept of a tender offer had not
been precisely defined. 5 Therefore, in order to avoid any tender
offer litigation, the attorneys proposed to structure a privately ne-
gotiated transaction.7 6 To maintain the private character of the
transaction, the attorneys advised limiting the number of
solicitations."
On January 16, 1978, at 4:00 P.M., some thirty-nine institutions
and four individuals were contacted and asked to sell their hold-
ings in BD. 7' Each solicitee was told that a non-diqclosed pur-
chaser, sometimes identified as in the top fifty of Fortune Maga-
zine's 500, was looking to acquire a 20% holding in BD stock; that
no transaction would be final unless 20% of the shares were ac-
quired; that the price was either $45 as a top final price or $40 with
protection, in the event shares were later bought at a higher figure;
and that the desired 20% goal was within reach, or that the order
was filling up fast and a hurried response was essential. Each solic-
itee was asked to respond within one hour or less, although some
were given until the next day.
By 5:35 P.M., the total shares of BD committed for sale reached
20% . 7 9 On January 17 and 18, couriers were dispatched with
checks to pay for the stock and collect the certificates. After the
dust had settled on "Sun's brilliantly designed, lightning strike", 0
Sun had control of 35% of BD's outstanding shares.
Sun's acquisitions gave rise to seven separate actions that were
consolidated for trial.81 The complaints alleged not only violations
of the tender offer provisions, but also a myriad of other securities
75. Id.
76. It is clear that privately negotiated transactions were not meant to be covered by
section 14(d) of the Williams Act. See 1968 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9; GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 454 F.2d 709, 720 n. 22 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
77. One Sun attorney believed 60 solicitees was safe; another argued for an upper limit
of 40, but within those limits the lawyers felt there would be no problem. Wellman v. Dick-
inson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918 at 95,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
78. Id. at 95,938.
79. Id. at 95,830.
80. Id. at 95,812.
81. The plaintiffs in the Dickinson case included: the SEC; BD; its officers; and several
of its shareholders, both individually and derivatively. The defendants included; Sun;
L.H.I.W., Inc., the corporation Sun formed to receive the BD shares; Salomon Brothers; F.
Eberstadt & Co., Inc; and Fairleigh S. Dickinson. Id. at 95,812-813.
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violations.8" A major issue was whether the 'solicitations and
purchases constituted a tender offer and, therefore, violated the
pre-disclosure requirements of Section 14(d).8 8
The Dickinson Opinion
The Dickinson court first addressed the distinction between a
privately negotiated transaction, which is outside the scope of sec-
tion 14 of the Williams Act, and a public transaction, which may
not be.84 The court noted that an arms-length negotiation between
two people epitomizes a private transaction. However, as the num-
ber of actors increases, the identifiable characteristics of private
activity become blurred.
To determine if the transaction was public or private, the Dick-
inson court looked to the case of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.85 Al-
though the court recognized that the Ralston Purina case was con-
cerned with the private offering -!xemption under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933 and not .der offer regulation, the court
reasoned that the provisions were analogous.86 The court adopted
the Ralston Purina test to distinguish a private from a public
transaction in the tender offer context.8 7
The Ralston Purina test involved several factors: (1) whether
the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the
82. Other securities law violations included aiding and abetting the violation of sections
10(b), 13(d) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (15 U.S.C. §§
78j(b), 78m(d), and 78n(e)); Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 and 13d-2), sections 17(d)
and 17(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, (15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(d),
80a-17(e)) and Rule 17d-1 (17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1).
83. This article focuses only on the section 14(d) violations and leaves the other viola-
tions for another time and place.
84. Wellman & Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918 at
95,836 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
85. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
86. The private offering exemption refers to section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). That statute allows stock to be exempted from the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act if it does not involve any public offering. Essentially, there are
two reasons for this exemption: (1) where there is a sufficiently small number of potential
investors involved, there is no public interest served by regulation; and (2) where the per-
sons offered unregistered stock are able, by reason of sophistication, knowledge or access to
information, to protect themselves from the abuses which the 1933 Act was designed to
prevent, there is no need for the additional protection afforded by registration.
The application of the private offering exemption rationale to the tender offer context had
been advocated by commentators. See, e.g., Developments In Tender Offers, supra note 24;
Block & Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEc. REG. L. J. 133, 139
(1978).
87. Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918 at
95,837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Act; (2) the number of solicitees; and (3) the party carrying the
burden of proof.88 Using this test, the Dickinson court determined
that: (1) the BD shareholders were in need of protection, especially
in light of the secretive nature and quickness of the transactions;
(2) the number of actors was sufficient to make the solicitation
public; and (3) Sun failed to carry the burden of showing that the
transaction was privately negotiated.89 The court concluded from
this that the transacton was public.
The Dickinson court next considered whether this public solici-
tation was in fact a tender offer.90 The court found the solicitations
possessed substantially all the elements of the traditional tender
offer.91 Moreover, Sun's scheme of acquisition was ". . . infected
with the basic evil which Congress sought to cure by enacting the
law." '92 The solicitations were designed to force hurried investment
decisions without the proper information. The court concluded
that it would undermine the remedial purposes of the Williams Act
to hold that Sun's secret operation was not covered by Section
14(d).98
Analysis of the Dickinson Decision
The Dickinson holding significantly expanded the accepted defi-
nition of a tender offer. As in the S-G Securities case, the focus
was on the substance of the transaction rather than its form. In
Dickinson, Sun did not attempt to disclose any information. Fur-
thermore, the solicitees were allowed only one hour to make a deci.
sion. The court was correct in its decision that these secretive ac-
88. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). An offering to investors who were
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction "not involving any public offering."
Id. at 125. The Ralston Purina court also decided that the statute applied to a public offer-
ing whether there were few or many solicitees, and that the burden of proof lay with the
party claiming the benefit of the private offering exemption. Id. at 126.
89. Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 96,918 at
95,839 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) .
90. Sun argued that because the entities solicited were mostly financial investment insti-
tutions who were "sophisticated investors", the public/private dichotomy was not impor-
tant. As sophisticated sellers, the institutions did not need the protections of the Williams
Act. The court turned away that contention by stating: "sophistication serves no purpose
unless it can be applied to the particulars of an investment or sale decision. Therefore,
sophistication and expertise cannot be relied on here to exempt this transaction from the
reach of Section 14(d)." Id. at 95,481.
91. See notes 10 through 14 supra and accompanying text.
92. Wellman & Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918 at
95,841 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
93. Id.
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tions produced the same pressure on shareholders as a tender offer.
The court's decision to apply the private offering exemption
analysis to tender offer situations helps to carve a distinction be-
tween a private transaction and a tender offer. Certain commenta-
tors have argued that the cut-off point between a privately negoti-
ated transaction and a tender offer should be a specific number of
solicitees. s4 However, using a quantitative test may confound the
statutory purpose of the Williams Act. For example, assume that
the requisite number of shareholders is set at thirty-five. If a pur-
chaser solicited 100 shareholders holding 3% of the outstanding
shares of a corporation, there would be a tender offer. However, if
the purchaser solicited only twenty shareholders holding 40% of
the outstanding shares, there may not be a tender offer.
The Dickinson decision rejected the quantitative test.5 By rely-
ing on Ralston Purina, the court placed the question of the num-
ber of solicitees into the background. The court reasoned that the
number of solicitees should not be the talisman that determines
whether a transaction is public. Rather, it is only one factor in de-
ciding whether the overall purchase scheme is public and thus reg-
ulated by the Williams Act.
The Dickinson decision also effectively prevents the "blitz-
krieg" ' type of corporate takeover. Prospective purchasers are
now forewarned that clandestine schemes to acquire control of a
corporation by purchasing stock will succeed only if (1) the
purchases are truly private, or (2) the disclosure rules of section
14(d) are followed.s The Dickinson court, moreover, has given
94. In Developments In Tender Offers, supra note 24, the authors suggest that the num-
ber of solicitees to be contacted in one year should be thirty-five.
Thus, if a prospective purchaser made solicitations to no more than thirty-five
shareholders within twelve months, he would be presumed not to have made a
tender offer for those shares. If he solicited more than thirty-five shareholders
within a year, he would be presumed to have made a public offer to buy those
securities, and unless he rebutted that presumption, would be subject to the re-
quirements of Section 14(d) so long as the solicitations came within the other pro-
visions of the statute. Id. at 6.
95. Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918, at
95,837 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
96. Although the Williams Act did not specifically provide a minimum period during
which a tender offer had to remain open, the withdrawal provision of section 78n(d)(5) was
construed as setting a minimum. Out of that interpretation grew the so-called "blitzkrieg"
offers limited to seven days. In the eyes of many, they had the effect of stampeding share-
holders into a hurried decision, a practice the Williams Act had sought to end. Sommer,
Tender Offer Rules Seek to Codify Permissible Conduct, 1 NAT'L L. S. 24 (Mar. 9, 1974).
97. It is interesting to note that the name of the corporation which was formed to accept
the BD shares, L.H.I.W., Corp., is an acronym standing for "Let's Hope It Works".
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other courts a standard to determine if a transaction is or is not
private.9"
A RECENT ATTEMPT TO "DEFINE" TENDER OFFER
The SEC has recently published proposed rule changes" that for
the first time offer a "definition"'100 of tender offers. The "first tier"
of the definition subjects stock purchases to tender offer regulation
if they involve an attempt to purchase more than 5% of the shares
outstanding from ten or more holders within a forty-five day pe-
riod.10 1 The "second tier" of the proposed regulation requires
tender offer regulation for purchases made in a "widespread",
broadly publicized offer that involves a premium above the market
price of 5% or $2 per share, whichever is greater, and in which
there is no "meaningful" opportunity for holders to negotiate price
and terms.
The proposed tender offer definition encompasses the schemes
in both S-G Securities and Dickinson. In Dickinson, the purchaser
attempted to buy more than 5% of the outstanding stock from ten
or more shareholders within a forty-five day period; this scheme
falls within the first tier. In S-G Securities, there was a wide-
spread, broadly publicized offer involving a premium above the
market price; this is an example of the second tier.
The proposed rules, however, do no more than codify the S-G
Securities and Dickinson opinions. The rules offer little more gui-
dance than the holdings of the cases themselves. Nevertheless, this
does not make the rules undesirable.102 The courts have struggled
to define a tender offer on a case by case basis. The codification of
this judicial development promotes consistency ". . . particularly
when one recognizes that the true touchstone of any effective sys-
98. The proposed ALI Federal Securities Code would circumvent the private/public is-
sue by suggesting a definition of the term tender offer based on the number of solic-
itees-thirty-five-regardless of the manner in which the offer was made. See ALI FED. SEC.
CODE § 299.9(a) (Tent. Drafts. Nos. 1-3 Revised 1974). See also, note 94, supra.
99. 44 Fed. Reg. 70349 (Dec. 6, 1979). These rules were left open to public comment
until February 1, 1980.
100. "Define" may not be the proper word, for what the SEC is doing is setting forth
situations in which the tender offer regulations will have effect. In essence, the SEC is defin-
ing by example. However, this method of "definition" still leaves the SEC the flexibility to
label new schemes as tender offers.
101. Note the lack of qualifying language with regard to "sophisticated" or "non-sophis-
ticated" holders. The SEC may be putting to rest the notion that the solicitee's sophistica-
tion may be taken into consideration in defining "tender offer".
102. The Proposed Rules are desirable because of their binding legal force, comparable
to the precedential weight of the two district court opinions discussed in this article.
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tern of jurisprudence is the promulgation of laws upon which men
can reasonably plan their affairs."' 03
CONCLUSION
The holdings of S-G Securities and Dickinson, along with the
SEC's recently proposed rules, give potential purchasers and the
courts a clearer framework within which to analyze tender offers.
This should aid in the determination of what purchasing schemes
constitute tender offers.
The two decisions are in no way an attempt by the judiciary to
"legislate" a definition for the phrase "tender offer". What the
courts have done is to interpret the Williams Act in accordance
with its legislative purpose of providing maximum protection for
investors. The S-G Securities and Dickinson cases merely come to
the further assistance and protection of the investor in situations
where insufficient disclosure and aggressive purchasing schemes
place an impermissible degree of pressure on the financial investor,
both institutional and private.
HENIY R. DAAR
103. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 75.
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